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1. Rationale 8 
 9 
Farmers in most developing countries are mainly smallholders, with average farm size of 1-2 10 
hectares. They tend to be constrained in investing in productivity-enhancing technologies 11 
because of limited household resources combined with lack of access to external finance on 12 
which they depend (Tadesse 2014). Smallholders often do not have access to credit 13 
provided by banks or special rural credit institutions. One of the constraints on such lending 14 
is the limited amount of collateral to securitize the repayment of the loan. This means that 15 
banks will have little recourse against defaulting borrowers. As a result, high-return economic 16 
cropping activities that typically require significant up-front investments (e.g. enhanced seeds 17 
and fertilizers) may be hampered by these credit constraints (Boucher et al., 2008). 18 
 19 
Provision of insurance can encourage higher supply of credit, both the implied demand for 20 
credit and supply thereof, and thus enhance agricultural inputs use. However, there is a lack 21 
of growth due to underdeveloped and imperfect markets for inputs, insurance and credit 22 
(Carter and Barrett, 2006; Cole et al., 2012) causing among others credit rationing. In the 23 
environment of underdeveloped and imperfect markets, a combined approach is needed 24 
(Alderman and Haque, 2007), as separate access to each of these is seriously restricted. 25 
 26 
More insight into the impact of linking insurance and credit is needed since there is limited 27 
information in the literature regarding the potential effect of bundling insurance and credit, for 28 
example on the extent to which insurance would reduce the cost of borrowing and make 29 
credit more accessible to the smallholder farmers (Tadesse et al., 2015). In this paper we 30 
review the most recent scientific literature on one specific form of insurance: index-insurance. 31 
As is well known; important advantages of index insurance are low administrative costs and 32 
the elimination of moral hazard. An important disadvantage is basis risk (see below). In this 33 
review paper we discuss the determinants of demand for index-insurance, the impact of 34 
index-insurance on smallholder livelihoods, and the existing links between index-insurance 35 
and credit. In this meta-analysis, we identify key discoveries on the potential of index-36 
insurance in enhancing credit supply for smallholders and thus farm productivity. We focus 37 
on index-based insurance products since it offers a tentative potential for coping with losses 38 
in lower income countries (Skees, 2008). 39 
 40 
 41 
2. Dataset 42 
 43 
Combining credit and insurance, or bundling index insurance with credit, is a practice that is 44 
widely discussed in literature but up to now rarely examined empirically. Published studies 45 
were retrieved following a systematic literature search in Scopus and Web of Science. 46 
Relevant empirical articles were identified by using the following criteria search algorithm: 47 
“insurance” and (“weather” or “micro” or “area-based” or “rain*” or “livestock” or "index"), and 48 
((“empiric*” or “experiment’ or “trial” or “RCT” or “impact”) or (“credit” or “loan*” or “debt” or 49 
“finance”)). We identified 1133 related papers, 110 of which were selected as closely 50 
matching the study criteria. This first level of screening was based on abstract review of all 51 
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the citations retrieved and all citations were discarded if they were clearly not related to 1 
empirical studies. After removing duplicates and second level of screening involving full-text 2 
article review, 45 papers were included in the current analysis. The framework for addressing 3 
insurance and credit issues, in the following sections, entails three subsequent themes, 4 
namely adoption of insurance, impact of insurance, and links between insurance and credit.  5 
 6 
There are several points to highlight from the assessment of papers in the systematic review. 7 
Empirical methods used most frequently in cross-sectional adoption studies are based on 8 
willingness-to-pay techniques or (framed) field experiments. Panel data designs based on 9 
annual household surveys of adopters and non-adopters to study adoption and/or impact are 10 
less frequently applied. Randomised control trials of commercial insurance products are, with 11 
some exceptions, rarely used. However, it should be noted that more recent studies on 12 
insurance are able to move beyond stated preferences by conducting field experiments. The 13 
research on bundled financial products is more novel and rests mainly on theoretical models, 14 
although some (framed) field experiments have also been conducted.  15 
 16 
3. Adoption of insurance 17 
  18 
In general, analysed studies revealed that demand for index-insurance has been low. Stated 19 
willingness-to-pay is nonetheless substantial in some studies; up to approximately 90% of 20 
participants want to pay for insurance products, see e.g. Carter et al (2014) and Heenkenda 21 
(2011). Actual demand is much lower, varying from 2% to 40% or 50% maximum, and with 22 
many studies indicating an uptake of less than one fourth. 23 
 24 
In this section, three key factors, comprising twelve indicators, that help explain demand for 25 
insurance are addressed, namely (1) risks; (2) behaviour; and (3) credit and liquidity 26 
constraints. The set of indicators related to risks are key to the neoclassical determinants of 27 
demand (i.e. risk aversion, risk, risk mitigation, basis risk and price). It appears, however, 28 
that they are insufficient in explaining the low demand for index-insurance. Hence, other 29 
behavioural indicators (i.e. understanding, trust and education) as well as indicators 30 
capturing credit and liquidity constraints (i.e. wealth, liquidity, credit and income) are 31 
assessed too. Jointly, these three factors cover the main aspects of research conducted on 32 
index-insurance so far. Each of the aforementioned factors and indicators are elaborated on 33 
and research findings are summarized in Table 1, 2 and 3 in the Appendix.  34 
 35 
It should also be noted that the determinants of demand for index-insurance are partially 36 
different from the determinants of demand for indemnity insurance. Index-insurance suffers 37 
from basis risk (i.e., index measurements does not match an individual insured’s actual 38 
losses), whereas Indemnity insurance does not (but to a lesser extent un-indemnified losses 39 
might occur). This makes index-insurance a more uncertain and complex problem, which 40 
results in other drivers of demand. Yet both covers are subject to other risks (e.g., delays in 41 
disbursement and underwriter default). 42 
 43 
3.1 Risks 44 
 45 
Risk aversion 46 
Theory predicts that insurance participation increases with risk aversion, as more risk averse 47 
decision makers are willing-to-pay more for the possibility to hedge risk. However, most 48 
empirical research consistently finds the opposite effect. In his ‘Theory of rational demand for 49 
index insurance’, Clarke (2011) states that uncertainty about the insurance product itself 50 
might decrease demand. Purchasing the product becomes a gamble or lottery in itself, which 51 
could or could not pay off. (As a result of the view, some studies have included ambiguity 52 
aversion as an additional factor explaining demand (Bryan, 2010; Elabed & Carter 2015)). 53 
Clarke concludes that for insurance premiums above actuarially fair values, demand will be 54 
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humped-shaped in risk aversion. This is indeed in line with the sign of the estimation results 1 
of Hill, Robles and Ceballos (2013), but these results were not statistically significant.  2 
 3 
Production risk 4 
In the presence of high production risk, demand for insurance is expected to be higher. On 5 
the other hand, smallholders might purposefully choose low levels of production risk. 6 
Investing in low-risk low-return rather than high-risk high-return activities produces a more 7 
stable stream of (low) income (Morduch, 1995). Thus, it is unclear whether a more risk prone 8 
environment leads to higher insurance demand, as lower levels of production risk could also 9 
result from imperfect insurance. In perfect markets, however, smallholders can insure risky 10 
activities, which could greatly improve their productivity.  11 
 12 
Empirical research that includes measures of risk indicate an ambiguous relation between 13 
amount of production risk and insurance uptake. Jensen, Mude & Barrett (2014a) find a 14 
negative albeit insignificant effect of the variance in livestock mortality on uptake. A similar 15 
effect is found by Vandeveer (2001) who measured the effect of the number of indicated 16 
risks on insurance uptake. Bogale (2015) finds a positive but insignificant effect of the 17 
perceived risk on uptake. No firm conclusions can be drawn yet.  18 
 19 
Risk mitigation 20 
It is expected that with a larger variety of risk mitigation strategies, the demand for insurance 21 
will be lower. Giné et al (2010) even state that index-insurance can only improve welfare if 22 
other risk-sharing mechanisms are insufficient. These strategies include, but are not limited 23 
to off-farm employment, planting a mix of crops, receiving remittances and credit. Dercon et 24 
al (2014), however, emphasize the benefits of index-insurance to groups that are only able to 25 
cover idiosyncratic risk in an informal manner. For these groups, index-insurance could be 26 
complementary to existing risk mitigation strategies to cover covariate risk too. 27 
 28 
Basis risk 29 
Demand for index-insurance is theoretically predicted and empirically confirmed to decrease 30 
at relatively high levels of basis risk. An increase in basis risk indicates a decrease in the 31 
correlation between individual losses and the indexed parameter, which makes the 32 
associated insurance indemnity relate imperfectly to one’s loss. An increase in basis risk thus 33 
devalues the product and limits demand. Various studies using proxies for basis risk veritably 34 
find a negative and significant effect of basis risk on demand.   35 
 36 
This effect of basis risk interacts with other factors, such as price and (informal) idiosyncratic 37 
risk sharing. Hill, Robles & Ceballos (2013) find that as the farm is located closer to the 38 
weather station, the elasticity of demand is high. For more distant locations demand 39 
becomes low. Jensen, Barrett & Mude (2014b), however, show that for low levels of 40 
observed design error demand is not responsive to changes in price, whereas demand does 41 
respond to price changes if the observed design error is of a high level. It is nonetheless 42 
subject to debate whether distance to the weather station and observed design errors are 43 
similar proxies for basis risk.  44 
 45 
Furthermore, Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) find that as basis risk increases, people of 46 
castes sharing idiosyncratic risks are more likely to purchase insurance than people from 47 
casts not sharing idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, Dercon et al (2012) conclude that index 48 
insurance and informal risk sharing are complements, as index-insurance mitigates covariate 49 
risk and informal risk sharing mechanisms concern idiosyncratic risk.  50 
 51 
Price 52 
In general, it is predicted that if price rises, demand falls (Clarke 2011). Empirical research 53 
confirms this prediction, although the effect of price on demand is not consistent across all 54 
research (see e.g. Elabed & Carter 2014). Important determinants are coverage and loading. 55 
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The latter means that if the loading factor increases, due to for example administration cost, 1 
demand will fall. Strikingly similar steep elasticities were found by Karlan et al., 2015 and 2 
Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012), with 11% and 15% purchase at market prices, 42% and 3 
38% purchase at a 50% discount (roughly actuarially fair prices), and 67% and 60% 4 
purchase at a 75% discount. As indicated before, the interaction with basis risk could shed 5 
more light on the relation between price and demand.  6 
 7 
3.2 Behaviour 8 
 9 
Understanding and previous insurance experiences 10 
One of the main reasons for low take up is said to be limited understanding of the workings 11 
of insurance and limited financial literacy. In order to increase demand, various studies have 12 
attempted to educate potential buyers. Educational or experimental games increase take up 13 
(see e.g. Hill, Robles & Ceballos, 2013; Gaurav, Cole & Tobacman, 2008). Although this 14 
seems arguable at a theoretical level, empirical research is still ambiguous. It appears that 15 
educational games slightly increase take up, but improving understanding of the product 16 
could also lower uptake among those that were overly optimistic in the product.   17 
 18 
In general, previous pay-outs have a much stronger effect on demand for insurance. Indeed, 19 
Berhane et al (2013) observe that “nothing sells insurance like insurance pay-outs”. This is 20 
confirmed by Cole, Stein and Tobacman (2014) who found that both previous pay-outs 21 
experienced by oneself and previous pay-outs to village members increase demand. Over-22 
inference from current pay-outs could nonetheless misrepresent the indemnity one could 23 
reasonably expect. 24 
 25 
Trust 26 
Strongly related to understanding are trust and education. Trust in the financial institution 27 
providing the insurance is considered important by for example Karlan et al (2014). Triggered 28 
insurance pay-outs should be processed as soon as possible without delays in disbursement 29 
to afford clients access to emergency cash. It is important to ensure that the participating 30 
financial institutions are sound and resilient, capable of delivering promised payments in the 31 
event of a disaster. Mistrust in the insurance company hence lowers demand. Empirical 32 
evidence about the magnitude of the effect of trust is still lacking.  33 
 34 
Education 35 
The level of education and training is often used as a proxy for financial literacy and 36 
understanding of the insurance product. The effect of education on insurance take up, 37 
however, is sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and often insignificant. For example 38 
Cole et al (2013) conclude that their education module aimed at increasing take up had no 39 
effect, but that trust and liquidity constraints are more important. In general, extension 40 
programs for promoting innovative rural insurance (and credit) in developing countries should 41 
be tailor-made to the local production and associated risks (Shee et al, 2015) in order to 42 
have impact.   43 
 44 
Various explanations for the limited effect of education on uptake have been suggested. On 45 
the one hand, Chantarat, Mude and Barrett (2009) suggest that the effect of education might 46 
be understood better with an interaction term. They show that the effect of education on 47 
uptake is larger for households that perceive the risk of losses to be high. Clarke and Kalani 48 
(2011), on the other hand, propose that it is not education or years of schooling that matters 49 
most, but rather a basic level of literacy.  50 
 51 
3.3 Credit and liquidity constraints 52 
 53 
Wealth 54 
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In neoclassical theory, demand for insurance is independent from one’s wealth. Insurance 1 
merely transfers wealth from high states to low states. In the presence of basis risk, however, 2 
index-insurance could worsen the lowest possible state and improve the best possible state 3 
(Clarke 2011). As a result, Clarke predicts that the effect of wealth on insurance demand is 4 
ambiguous. If insurance is a normal good, demand increases with wealth, but if insurance is 5 
an inferior good, demand decreases with wealth. De Nicola and Hill (2013), however, predict 6 
that demand for index-insurance will be hump-shaped in wealth. Wealthier households 7 
purchase more index-insurance than poor households, up to the point that they can self-8 
insure their assets.   9 
 10 
The prediction of De Nicola and Hill is in line with the findings of Clarke and Kalani (2011) 11 
who indeed find that the demand for wealth is inverse U-shaped in the amount of wealth. 12 
They proxy wealth with livestock and land assets, but only find the predicted effect for 13 
livestock, as all land in Ethiopia is state-owned and does not allow one to invest in it. All other 14 
empirical research does not report non-linear relationships. Consequently, the empirical 15 
results are rather mixed. Chantarat, Mude and Barrett (2009), for example, find a negative 16 
effect of wealth on insurance coverage levels. They explain this by considering wealth as a 17 
buffer stock and a form of risk mitigation, so that high levels of wealth enable self-insurance 18 
and diminish the need for alternative forms of insurance.  19 
 20 
Liquidity 21 
Giné et al (2010) indicate that 80% of the people who did not purchase insurance mentioned 22 
insufficient funds as the most important reason for remaining uninsured. Credit markets are 23 
thus failing alongside insurance markets. Indeed, most research demonstrates a positive 24 
relation between liquidity and insurance take up. If a high cash reward prior to purchasing 25 
insurance is given, insurance take up increases (Cole et al, 2013). Karlan et al (2014), find 26 
however that capital constraints are not binding in insurance take up. If smallholders are 27 
offered insurance, they are able to find ways to finance it.  28 
 29 
Credit 30 
Empirical research so far is mixed. For example, Chantarat, Mude and Barrett (2009) find 31 
that credit-constrained households choose a larger coverage than non-constrained 32 
households. If households do not have other coping mechanisms, such as credit, insurance 33 
is needed. This particular risk mitigation strategy, however, is perceived differently by Giné, 34 
Townsend and Vickery (2008), as they find that credit constraints limit insurance take-up.  35 
 36 
Income  37 
In theory, income should not affect demand for index-insurance. However, as income serves 38 
as an indication of wealth and functions as a buffer stock or risk mitigation strategy, a 39 
connection between income and insurance demand can be expected. In fact, some studies 40 
find a positive and significant effect of income on insurance demand. Chantarat, Mude and 41 





4. Impact of insurance 47 
 48 
In order to measure the impact of index-insurance, various methods have been employed. 49 
Some impact assessments are solely based on theoretical models. These findings are 50 
partially confirmed by (framed) field experiments. The amount of empirical evidence, 51 
however, is still very limited. Table 4 in the Appendix summarizes the outcome of studies 52 
measuring the impact of index-insurance. In these studies, the common treatment was 53 
(access to) index-insurance. In this section, the impact of insurance on production decisions, 54 
investment and welfare are further elaborated upon. 55 
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 1 
In general, the effect of insurance on production decisions, investment and welfare seems to 2 
be positive. Starting with the theoretical models, it has been predicted that index-insurance 3 
increases investment (De Nicola and Hill, 2013). Elabed et al (2013) foresee that index 4 
insurance will lead to an increase in the number of smallholders as well as the area planted 5 
and will encourage investment in profitable, but risky crops, as credit rationing will diminish. 6 
The effect of insurance on general welfare seems to be positive too. De Nicola (2015) and 7 
De Nicola and Hill (2013) indicate a positive effect of insurance on consumption, although 8 
income may fall at first as a result. Their findings suggest that the welfare gains are larger for 9 
poor households. 10 
 11 
The effect of index-insurance has to some extent been confirmed empirically. Cheng (2014), 12 
for example, finds that credit diverters choose to invest more credit in production when index 13 
insurance becomes available. Credit diversion occurs when borrowers divert production 14 
loans away from productive investment towards consumption, which is a type of moral 15 
hazard behavior (Cheng, 2014). Cole, Giné and Vickery (2013) study the changes prior to 16 
the growing season and find that insured farmers invest more in risky crops and in 17 
economies of scale, but do not use more inputs. Similarly, Karlan et al (2014) demonstrate 18 
that insurance leads to shifting towards a more risky portfolio of crops, although the higher 19 
harvest value does not necessarily outweigh the extra expenditures. Jensen, Barrett & Mude 20 
(2014a) also find that households with insurance increase investments in livestock health 21 
services and experience an increase in milk production and total income. 22 
 23 
In these studies, various explanations for the positive impact of insurance are put forward. 24 
Jensen, Barrett and Mude (2104a) suggest that insurance leads to a reduction in 25 
precautionary savings, which subsequently leads to an increase in investment. McIntosh, 26 
Sarris and Papadopoulos (2013) propose that index-insurance does not necessarily increase 27 
investments, but leads to a protection of those who already have higher levels of investment. 28 
They thus suggest that the role of index-insurance is palliative rather than transformative. 29 
Janzen and Carter (2013) explore an alternative mechanism. They state that insurance can 30 
be beneficial in different ways for households above and below a certain asset threshold. 31 
With insurance, households below the asset line are prevented from cutting down 32 
consumption, whereas households above the asset line do not sell their assets during a 33 
shock if they are insured. 34 
 35 
Nonetheless, not all findings on impact have been positive. Farrin and Murray (2014) report a 36 
negative effect of insurance on wealth as in good years farmers pay a premium but do not 37 
receive an indemnity payment, while Mishra (1994) finds that the availability of insurance 38 
eventually leads to larger inequality. Karlan et al (2014), lastly, provide some evidence that 39 
the insurance grant improves household welfare for some individual measures, but not for an 40 
aggregate measure of household welfare. 41 
 42 
Compared to other insurance products, it has been suggested that an interlinked or bundled 43 
contract dominates either credit or insurance (De Nicola and Hill 2013). Carter, Cheng & 44 
Sarris (2013) claim that an interlinked contract will always outperform self-insurance, while 45 
insurance only outperforms self-insurance if the household has a high level of collateral. 46 
According to De Nicola (2015) insurance increases welfare more than either savings or 47 
credit. 48 
 49 
One of the main drawbacks of index-insurance, however, arises from relatively high levels of 50 
basis risk and loading costs. However, loadings are seldom reported and cases reported 51 
focus on small-scale donor funded experiments, making a comparison with more matured 52 
indemnity based insurance products difficult. In most models, the welfare gains are large 53 
provided that basis risk and loading costs are sufficiently low (De Nicola, 2015; Elabed et al 54 
2013; Carter, Cheng & Sarris, 2013). If this does not hold, a simply savings account can 55 
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easily outperform the benefits of index-insurance (De Nicola & Hill, 2013). This is confirmed 1 
by Jensen, Barrett & Mude (2014a). They find that index-based livestock insurance reduces 2 
covariate risk and leads to improved semi-variance in livestock survival rates, as long as the 3 




5. Bundling insurance with credit 8 
 9 
Turning to the link between index-insurance and credit, several research lines in the literature 10 
can be explored. Some studies focus on the combined impact of credit and insurance while 11 
other studies seek to understand the effect of insurance on credit or vice versa. This latter 12 
type of research ties in with the question of whether these products are complements or 13 
substitutes. Again other studies focus on comparing different types of financial products. In 14 
this section, several of these topics are further elaborated upon. Please refer to Table 5 in 15 
the Appendix for a full overview of these studies.  16 
 17 
The model provided by Carter, Cheng and Sarris (2011) provides a useful starting point. 18 
They compare three types of insurance: a formal insurance contract, implicit insurance 19 
through a loan, and self-insurance. Comparing self-insurance with implicit insurance through 20 
a loan, they find that some farmers with high collateral choose not to borrow as they do not 21 
want to put their collateral at risk. These farmers are so-called risk-rationed if no insurance is 22 
available. This risk constraint could alter in the presence of formal insurance. If insurance is 23 
available, the asset-rich farmers do borrow. Index insurance decreases the risk they face, 24 
which leads to lower default rates as well as a lower probability of losing one’s collateral. 25 
Thus, farmers with high collateral gain from the stand-alone insurance as they bear all the 26 
risk of losing the collateral themselves. On the other hand, farmers with little collateral 27 
choose to borrow if the interest rate is not too high, as high interest rates serve as a 28 
substitute for collateral. These farmers are price rationed if they cannot afford the high 29 
interest rate. As these farmers have little collateral, they do not bear the risk of losing it 30 
either. Purchasing an insurance contract is thus beneficial to their lenders, but provides little 31 
additional benefits to the borrowers. Providing the farmers with a stand-alone insurance 32 
contract does not alter the terms of borrowing. Concerning the combined impact of credit and 33 
insurance, Carter, Cheng and Sarris (2011) predict that more credit and better technology 34 
will be available with an interlinked contract compared to a default state of self-insurance. 35 
Interlinked contracts also perform better than standalone insurance contracts, as interlinked 36 
contracts lead to better technology use for both low and high levels of collateral, whereas 37 
standalone insurance contracts only lead to better technology use for high levels of collateral 38 
compared to self-insurance. Farrin and Miranda (2014), however, predict that technology use 39 
will be highest among households with only insurance compared to households with a 40 
bundle. This finding is probably related to the ease of default, as default with little punishment 41 
provides incentives to use higher levels of technology. In De Nicola (2015) and De Nicola & 42 
Hill (2013) the welfare gains for various financial products are calculated on the basis of data 43 
from Burkina Faso and Senegal and Ethiopia, respectively. Compared to index-insurance, 44 
insured credit has even larger welfare gains in the Ethiopian context but not in the west-45 
African countries.  46 
 47 
Most studies find a positive relation between access to credit and insurance demand. 48 
Several studies report that access to credit leads to larger willingness-to-pay (Bogale, 2015; 49 
McIntosh, Sarris and Papadopoulos, 2013; Hill, Hoddinott & Kumar, 2011). Similarly, it is 50 
found that access to credit leads to larger index-insurance take up (Giné, Townsend & 51 
Vickery, 2008; Clarke & Kalani, 2011). Exceptionally, Chantarat, Mude & Barrett (2009) state 52 
that credit-constrained households insure more, as insurance demand increases if other risk 53 
mitigations strategies, such as credit, are insufficient.  54 
 55 
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The effect of insurance on credit is contested. Insurance could unlock credit and lead to 1 
larger investments, but could also lead to undesired side effects such as higher default rates. 2 
Carter et al. (2007) consider that index based insurance could limit the risk of insolvency of 3 
the lender due to covariate risk or might improve the repayment rate and variation in 4 
repayment of the borrowers (Mishra, 1994). Although a stand-alone insurance contract does 5 
not by definition lead to lower interest rate, lenders could choose to do so. Indeed, Mahul and 6 
Skees (2007) observe that lenders lowered interest rate and were willing to lend more. This 7 
could prevent the microfinance institution from becoming insolvent in case of systemic 8 
default (Farrin & Miranda, 2014). Index based insurance seems to be likely to relax supply-9 
sided constraints, i.e. quantity rationing, too (Giné & Yang, 2009). Similarly, McIntosh, Sarris 10 
and Papadopoulos (2013) as well as Elabed et al (2013) report that index-insurance could 11 
help to unlock agricultural credit by limiting credit constraints. Carter, Cheng and Sarris 12 
(2011) state that more credit could be taken out with insurance and even more with an 13 
interlinked contract. 14 
 15 
Two studies, however, point at negative rather than a positive effect of index based 16 
insurance on credit supply. Clarke and Dercon (2009) suggest that insurance could possibly 17 
crowd-out credit if insurance changes the behavior of the borrower. A stand-alone insurance 18 
product could increase the minimum welfare level that can be reached in case of strategic 19 
default by the borrower. In this way, quantity rationing could become more severe. Farrin and 20 
Miranda (2013) confirm that the possibility exists that banks are willing to lend less if the 21 
borrower has acquired a non-interlinked insurance contract, because insured borrowers have 22 
higher default rates than  uninsured borrowers. Farrin and Miranda (2014) compare two 23 
scenarios, one in which the indemnity of the insurance is paid to the borrower and one in 24 
which the indemnity is paid to the lender and deducted from the required repayment. The 25 
authors also compare these two scenarios to two benchmarks: one in which households 26 
have only credit and one in which households have taken up credit and insurance 27 
independently. They find that default rates are higher in the scenario in which the indemnity 28 
payment is paid directly to the household instead of the bank. The bundled products, 29 
however, have lower default rates than the situations with only credit or independent offering 30 
of credit and insurance, as defaulting on the bundled product would bar the household from 31 
taking out both credit and insurance in the future. Strikingly, default rates for the situation 32 
with credit and insurance offered separately are larger than for credit only. Negative 33 
spillovers could arise, in line with the predictions from Clarke & Dercon (2009). It is also 34 
found that the propensity to borrow is larger with the bundled contracts than the other 35 
contracts. 36 
 37 
Little empirical evidence on the effect of index based insurance on credit rationing exists, but 38 
some studies provide more insights. In an experimental game conducted in China, Cheng 39 
(2014) studies the effect of offering index based insurance to risk rationed households. He 40 
finds more than half of the farmers that are risk rationed decide to apply for credit when 41 
insurance is made available to them. Additionally, roughly two thirds of the credit diverters 42 
choose to use their loan for productive investment rather than consumption when insurance 43 
is made available. The rationale behind this finding is that insurance reduces production risk, 44 
while the risk associated with using the loan for consumption stays constant or might even 45 
increase as the households pays for the premium but do not invest.  46 
 47 
Further insights are provided in the work by Giné and Yang (2009). They offered maize 48 
farmers in Malawi the choice between a loan and a loan plus insurance, which indemnifies if 49 
rainfall is insufficient. Although they expected that farmers would prefer the insured loan over 50 
the stand-alone loan, demand for the stand-alone loan was 13% higher than for the insured 51 
loan. Insurance did not lead to higher demand for credit. However, the authors suggest that 52 
the limited liability clause of the stand-alone loan provided some implicit form of insurance. 53 
As suggested by Carter et al. (2011), a stand-alone insurance product (which effectively was 54 
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the product studied by Giné and Yang) does not provide additional benefits to farmers with 1 
low collateral.  2 
 3 
Verteramo-Chiu et al. (2012) conduct a study on the determinants of risk rationing. Although 4 
they too expected that insurance would have a negative effect on risk rationing, they find that 5 
risk rationing takes place despite the presence of insurance markets. The authors suggest 6 
that while absence of insurance may be a sufficient condition for risk rationing it may not be a 7 
necessary condition.  8 
 9 
Groh and McKenzie (2014) focus on risk rationing too by randomly offering current borrowers 10 
the opportunity to purchase an insurance product to hedge the risk of political uncertainty 11 
and macroeconomic instability. They tested whether the offer of insurance leads to an 12 
increase in in the likelihood of renewing one’s loan. Although they encountered a large 13 
demand for insurance, the insurance offer did not affect borrowing behavior. As an 14 
explanation, it is suggested that the insurance does not cover the type of risk that hinders the 15 
investments made by small and medium enterprises.  16 
 17 
Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega (2011) uncover some of the dynamics how lenders might 18 
manage their equity risk when borrowers are required to purchase index-insurance. Similar 19 
to suggestions of Carter, Cheng and Sarris (2013), higher wealth levels are associated with 20 
larger repayment as the threat of being permanently excluded from the market limits default. 21 
Considering the effect of subsidies on the insurance premium, Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega 22 
find that default rates increase if borrowers are required to purchase unsubsidized insurance, 23 
i.e. above actuarially fair levels, as the premium creates a disincentive to repay one’s loan. In 24 
contrast, default rates slightly decrease with subsidized insurance, i.e. below actuarially fair 25 
levels. As a consequence, requiring borrowers to purchase unsubsidized insurances reduces 26 
and destabilizes bank equity growth. On the contrary, equity growth would increase and 27 
stabilize if the bank would purchase insurance itself.    28 
 29 
The above survey clearly shows that the link between credit and insurance is still highly 30 
uncertain. As a consequence, the relevance of bundling credit and insurance is contested. 31 
Some studies point at positive effects of a combined product. Yet a recent rigorous analysis 32 
by Karlan et al (2014) suggests the opposite. They study the effects of insurance and capital 33 
grants on investment and welfare among Ghanaian farmers. Comparing farmers who only 34 
received the insurance grant with farmers who received both an insurance and a capital 35 
grant, they find that the former do not invest less than the latter. Apparently, farmers with 36 
solely insurance are able to find credit to increase investments. This indicates that insurance 37 
is able to overcome investment obstacles, whereas a lack of credit is not the bottleneck to 38 
investment. The policy conclusion that can be drawn from their analysis is that bundling 39 
(rainfall) insurance with credit may not be useful after all.    40 
 41 
 42 
6. Concluding remarks 43 
 44 
In the current review, the determinants for demand for index-insurance, the impact of index-45 
insurance and the links between credit and index-insurance have been discussed. Although 46 
many studies on these topics have been conducted in recent years, much empirical research 47 
still has to be conducted in order to truly understand the workings of index-insurance.  48 
 49 
Concerning the determinants of demand, a number of indicators deserve additional attention. 50 
For example, it is not confirmed yet that demand is indeed hump-shaped in risk aversion and 51 
the functional form of this relationship should be tested in more detail. This also holds for the 52 
magnitude of the effect of trust and education on actual insurance demand. Furthermore, it is 53 
unclear to what extent other risk mitigation strategies form complements or substitutes to 54 
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index-insurance. Understanding how index-insurance could work together or replace existing 1 
mechanisms is key to evaluating the decisions taken by smallholders  2 
 3 
As becomes clear in this review, the impact of index-insurance has only been understood to 4 
a limited extent. Some positive effects of index-insurance have been established, yet a 5 
number of adverse net income effects results have been reported too. Thus, more research 6 
is needed in order to verify to what extent insurance is really beneficial for smallholders. This 7 
research could also focus more on differential ways in which insurance could prove 8 
advantageous, for example by distinguishing between income smoothing and income 9 
enhancing effects of index-insurance.  10 
 11 
Another research venue is to assess the impact of bundled products, for example the 12 
combination of insurance and credit. Limited rigorous empirical research on the workings of 13 
these bundled products has been conducted. For example, it is unknown to what extent 14 
credit suppliers would react to the insured status of farmers or what the preferences of 15 
farmers are when it comes to a mix of financial products. In addition, several researchers 16 
have suggested that microfinance institutions or banks could insure themselves against 17 
covariate risk, yet no empirical evidence about this insurance mechanism has been 18 
conducted so far. One of the only rigorous analysis that is available is by Karlan et al. (2014), 19 
who identify the absence of insurance – rather than credit – as the binding constraint. Their 20 
main message seems not to be in favour of bundling credit with insurance. However, their 21 
analysis refers to one country –Ghana– only, and it has yet to be verified to what extent their 22 
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